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Vice Admiral J. J. Blackham, and Admiral
Sir Peter Abbott, written between 1995
and 1998. These provide perceptive British insights on the changing maritime
dimension of our post–Cold War world
and the increased roles for maneuvers
and forward presence in shaping a new
strategic environment. These are exactly
the kinds of issues with which the U.S.
armed forces are now struggling.

Berkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. Best
Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2000. 203pp. $22.50

The U.S. intelligence community, as it
currently exists, is fundamentally flawed
and must be remade. With this opening
premise, Bruce Berkowitz, a senior consultant at RAND Corporation, and Allan
Goodman, former dean of the
The essays’ chief drawbacks are their
brevity and what they do not say. The in- Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service, present their bluereviewer occupies a position of special re- print for the future of American intelligence.

A book
sponsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in
context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a
heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge
with reason and consistency.

According to the authors, a
trio of factors threatens to
leave the intelligence community ineffective and irrelevant.
First, it is no revelation that
ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER
the end of the Cold War has
left the intelligence commusights presented are clearly worthwhile
nity without a single clear threat as a foand for that very reason deserve expancus for its analytic efforts. The past
sion. For example, what were the workemphasis on the Soviet Union offered ining-level debates that undergirded the
telligence analysts historical continuity.
flag officers’ presentations? The fact that
Change tended to be evolutionary; for
the essays cover the seven-year period up
example, one generation of Soviet subto only three years ago would indicate
marines offered insights into the next.
that the issues raised with regard to the
Today, however, nations and nonstate
changing role of naval forces in the new
actors have unprecedented access to
century are still as far from being fully re- technology and information and with it a
solved in the Royal Navy as they are in
new capability to organize and operate
the U.S. naval service. This suggests room rapidly across borders. These developfor both an equivalent American publica- ments create the prospect of an “instantion and another Maritime Strategic
taneous threat” against the United States
Studies Institute paper, as both navies
from entirely unexpected sources.
continue the process of rethinking naval
Second, if Carl von Clausewitz was corpower that collectively began in 1991.
rect in defining intelligence as “every sort
EDWARD A. SMITH, JR.
of information about the enemy and his
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
country,” fundamental changes in inforWashington Studies and Analysis
mation management must create fundaThe Boeing Company
Arlington, Virginia
mental changes in intelligence. Berkowitz
and Goodman observe that the intelligence community was created on an

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001

5/14/01
Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:07 PM

1

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 15

industrial model designed for the efficient production of standardized products. But today, consumers receive
customized, on-demand information
from their stockbrokers, news services,
and on-line retailers; they expect nothing
less from their intelligence suppliers.
Further, intelligence products have become just one of the numerous data
streams used by decision makers—and
not necessarily the most important one.
Americans are increasingly skeptical of
“received wisdom” from authority (institutional or individual) and will “channel
surf” for the intelligence support they
expect.
Finally, the authors discuss the challenges
posed by changes in American political
attitudes toward intelligence. Where
Americans once allowed intelligence
agencies to be accountable to but a handful of elected officials, today they increasingly expect much more transparency to
the public. Further, political realities suggest that for the foreseeable future intelligence agencies will receive no additional
funding.
The likely bureaucratic answer to these
challenges is to reorganize, seek efficiencies, and work more closely with the customer. However, the authors believe that
seeking greater efficiency within the current intelligence model is not an effective
answer. While they give the intelligence
community high marks for satisfying
identified customer requirements, they
believe that today’s world of “instantaneous threats” and operations other than
war makes it impossible for most customers to identify intelligence requirements early enough to permit the
intelligence bureaucracy to respond. Simply put, today’s structure is a recipe for
always being a step behind.
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The solution proposed in Best Truth is a
transition to what Berkowitz and Goodman dub an “adaptable intelligence organization.” Ad hoc groups would address
specific customer problems. Expanded
use of contractors or part-time employees with specialized skills would provide
expertise for unanticipated threats. Further, the authors suggest the establishment of what they call a “virtual
economy” to fund the intelligence community. Major intelligence consumers
would control funding dedicated to their
intelligence requirements and would
have the option of spending it on any intelligence organization or discipline they
believe could satisfy their needs. Intelligence agencies would cease to have “lanes
in the road”; any agency could propose a
solution to a customer problem. One intended effect of this virtual economy
would be to force government agencies
out of tasks that can be performed more
efficiently by the private sector. Intelligence organizations would focus on
emerging technologies not yet profitable
for private industry, and on unique,
high-risk espionage operations that only
government organs can perform.
The bottom line of this work—a design
for the future U.S. intelligence community—is not particularly satisfying. The
broad outline presented leaves the reader
looking for more—more specifics, more
examples, more justifications. In its defense, however, the book is offered as a
“manifesto” and not an exhaustive study.
Its value lies in the clear and insightful
statement of the challenges facing the intelligence community and the questions
that they raise. Although it falls short of
what its title promises, Best Truth is
thought-provoking reading for intelligence professionals and naval officers
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who are interested in the challenges of
the information age.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Norfolk, Virginia

Peters, Ralph. Fighting for the Future: Will America
Triumph? Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole Books,
1999. 210pp. $19.95

The introductory pages of this book are
suffused with a disagreeable arrogance
and condescension. Speaking of the U.S.
Army in which he spent his career, Ralph
Peters states that he is “loyal to it still,
much as one might care for an old lover
felled by drink and bad decisions.” With
a metaphorical sad shake of the head but
his face set nobly toward a higher truth,
he sets out on a twelve-essay description
of his vision of the future and the blindness of today’s military leaders. This reviewer was quite prepared for an annoying
slog through a tendentious book.
Yet Fighting for the Future turned out to
be a provocative, if strident, collection of
essays (published separately between 1994
and 1999). Although Peters’s intellectual
arrogance does not lessen throughout, he
offers many cogent arguments and observations on a variety of themes that ought
not to be dismissed out of hand, even if
some ultimately are not persuasive. They
directly address core issues underlying
many of the most difficult problems
facing today’s civilian and military
leadership.
Peters depicts a dark and violent future.
In the opening essay, “The Culture of
Future Conflict,” he argues that “future
wars and violent conflicts will be shaped
by the inabilities [sic] of governments to
function as effective systems of resource
distribution and control, and by the
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failure of entire cultures to compete in
the postmodern age. . . . Basic resources
will prove inadequate for populations exploding beyond natural limits. . . . There
will be fewer classic wars but more violence. . . . Intercultural struggles, with
their unbridled savagery, are the great
nightmare of the next century.”
The post–Cold War U.S. military is singularly unprepared to deal with this future. Politicians and military leaders alike
fundamentally misunderstand this brave
new world. As a result, we will “face a
dangerous temptation to seek purely
technological responses to behavioral
challenges” and will “need to struggle
against our American tendency to focus
on hardware and bean counting to attack
the more difficult and subtle problems
posed by human behavior and regional
history.” The forces we are buying today
at exorbitant cost may prove unusable
against actual future threats. Peters argues
that against a broad range of emerging
threats, new rules of engagement rather
than new weapons are needed, since no
nation or other entity can face us head to
head in conventional terms. “We are
constrained by a past century’s model of
what armies do, what police do, and what
governments legally can do. Our opponents have none of this baggage.”
One essay takes issue with the notion of a
technologically based revolution in military affairs (RMA). Though to a degree
he argues against straw men, Peters’s
main point is that technological issues
are secondary to understanding the human nature of future foes—no argument
there. On the other hand, in another essay he claims that “current and impending technologies could permit us to
reinvent warfare,” allowing us to attack
instigators of violence rather than their
populations. Ironically, two other essays
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